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Abstract 
When an activity is unwanted, administrators often adopt a zero tolerance policy 
towards that activity. The background assumption is that, by adopting a zero tolerance 
policy, one is doing everything that one can to reduce or eliminate the activity in 
question. Yet which policy best serves to reduce an unwanted behavior is always an 
empirical question. Thus, those who adopt a zero tolerance policy towards some 
behavior without first investigating and finding that they are in a set of circumstances 
where that policy is the most cost-effective way of reducing or eliminating the 
undesirable behavior are committing the zero tolerance fallacy.  
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1. Introduction 
This short paper has two goals. The first is to convince people that, when people 
advocate or adopt a zero tolerance policy, they are frequently committing a fallacy. The 
second is to stimulate people who suspect such a fallacy is being committed to accuse 
those they think are committing the fallacy of committing the zero tolerance fallacy. 
What I am suggesting, then, is that we add something to the rhetorician’s arsenal: a 
newly named fallacy to hurl at opponents. I am aware of the downsides of suggesting 
this. As Quine observed, “[r]hetoric is the literary technology of persuasion, for good or 
ill” and it holds “the goal of persuasion above the goal of truth” (1987: 183). I must 
therefore make at least a prima facia case that, in this instance, more good than ill is 
likely to result from introducing the rhetorical device of the zero tolerance fallacy into 
our conversations about public policy.1 
When an activity meets with widespread public disapproval and politicians or 
administrators feel the need to react, they often adopt the rhetoric of “zero tolerance”.  
The implicit (and sometimes explicit) message is that, by adopting a zero tolerance 
policy towards an activity, one is doing all that one can—at least all that one can qua 
policy adoption—to reduce or eliminate the activity in question. Yet which policy or 
policies should be adopted to reduce or eliminate an unwanted behavior is always an 
empirical question, the answer to which will vary with the particular circumstances. And 
in many circumstances (indeed, in most circumstances), adopting a zero tolerance policy 
(whether alone or in concert with other policies and actions) is not the best way to 
combat unwanted behaviors. Thus, those who adopt a zero tolerance policy towards 
some behavior without first investigating and finding that they are in a set of 
circumstances where that policy is the most cost-effective way of reducing or 
eliminating the undesirable behavior are committing the zero tolerance fallacy. Or so I 
will argue. 
I begin with a quick overview of the nature of fallacies, and I argue, in this case 
at least, for a fairly narrow conception of what sorts of arguments should even be 
considered as candidates to become named fallacies. I then say a few things about when 
we should name a fallacious argument. I then characterize the zero tolerance fallacy and 
argue that it is sufficiently common and sufficiently dangerous to warrant being included 
among those fallacies we name (and I argue for the name “zero tolerance fallacy”). I 
follow this with a few remarks concerning why people commit this fallacy (and in the 
course of doing so seek to justify the first word in my title—“intolerance”). I then turn to 
various objections and problems. I close with a summary of the benefits that would 
accrue were the term “zero tolerance fallacy” to become widely adopted. 
2. The Nature of Fallacies 
                                                
1 I recognize that not all accounts of rhetoric (or all rhetoricians) accept Quine’s view that the discipline 
holds persuasion above truth. Though I note that Aristotle, the founder of the discipline, held this view. 
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There is a long tradition among those who study rhetoric and critical thinking to 
find and name particular fallacies. Aristotle observed that “some reasonings are genuine 
while others seem to be so but are not,” and he used the term “fallacies” for those 
instances of reasoning that appear to be acceptable but in fact are not. 2 Aristotle, and 
especially his followers, went on to name several, thus turning fallacy identification and 
naming into something of an intellectual cottage industry. Galileo, who in general was 
not a friend of the Aristotelians, offered a more liberal account of what a fallacy is, 
holding that any unsound argument—any argument that fails to be both valid and have 
only true premises—was fallacious. Thus, he writes:  
 
Either those who are to be persuaded are capable of understanding the 
reasons of Copernicus and others who follow him, or they are not; 
moreover, either these reasons are true and demonstrative, or they are 
fallacious. If those who are to be persuaded are incapable, then they 
will never be persuaded by the true or by the false reasons; those who 
are capable of understanding the strength of the demonstrations will 
likewise never be persuaded if these demonstrations are fallacious; so 
neither those who do nor those who do not understand will be 
persuaded by fallacious reasons. Therefore, given that absolutely no 
one can be dissuaded from the first idea by fallacious reasons, it 
follows as a necessary consequence that, if anyone is persuaded of the 
contrary of what he previously believed, the reasons are persuasive 
and true. But as a matter of fact there are many who are already 
persuaded by Copernican reasons. Therefore, it is true both that these 
reasons are effective and that the opinion does not deserve the label of 
ridiculous but the label of worthy of being very carefully considered 
and pondered (1615: 70).  
 
An even broader use of  “fallacy” occurs in a report of an incident between the 
Greenpeace ship Sea Shepherd and a Costa Rican shark-fishing boat. The Sea Shepherd 
Society, responding to a claim that the Sea Shepherd had endangered the crew of the 
Costa Rican fishing boat, wrote, “the video evidence proves this to be a fallacy”. Here 
“fallacy” simply seems to mean “false claim”.3 
                                                
2 On Sophistical Refutations 164a22. 
3 See http://www.seashepherd.org/news-and-media/2012/05/13/captain-paul-watson-arrested-in-frankfurt-
germany-on-warrant-issued-by-costa-rica-1374 and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18066901 
(19. August 2012). 
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The contemporary literature on fallacies sides with Aristotle against Galileo, 
restricting fallacies to a subset of invalid arguments.4 (The Greenpeace use is—rightly in 
my view—just ignored by contemporary critical thinking theorists as a case of 
overblown rhetoric.) Thus Gregory Bassham, William Irwin, Henry Nardone, and James 
M. Wallace, in their popular textbook, write that some “arguments are sound and 
convincing but many are fallacious. An argument is fallacious when it contains one or 
more logical fallacies. A logical fallacy—or fallacy, for short—is an argument that 
contains a mistake in reasoning” (Bassham et al, 2011: 119, emphasis in original).5  So a 
fallacy is a mistake in reasoning—not just the acceptance of a false premise—and a 
mistake that is unlikely to be noticed and hence is likely to be convincing. Joseph Heath 
puts the same point as follows: “Strictly speaking, a fallacy is simply an argument that 
takes you from true premises to a false conclusion. What makes it a fallacy, though, as 
opposed to simply a mistake is that a fallacy sounds right when you first hear it. In fact, 
it often requires considerable subtlety to see why a fallacious inference is, in fact, 
invalid” (2009: 309). Unfortunately, Heath’s way of putting it obscures the fact that 
even an argument with false premises may be fallacious. What he should have 
claimed—and from the context it is clear that this was his intention—is that a fallacious 
argument is one such that, were the premises true, it still could lead you to a false 
conclusion, and where, despite this fatal flaw, the argument seems to be a good one.6 So, 
we may say that an argument is fallacious when it is invalid but appears to be valid. And 
the better the fallacy (qua fallacy), the more difficult it is to see that the appearance of 
validity does not correspond to the invalidity of the argument.  
 Trudy Govier adds another feature, saying that a fallacy is “a common 
mistake in arguing. It is a mistake in the reasoning that underlies an argument. The 
mistake can be quite deceptive by seeming to many people to be just like correct 
reasoning” (105, emphasis added). So fallacious arguments that are common are called 
fallacies.  
 We now have three conditions for an argument being an instance of a 
fallacy: it must be invalid, it must appear to be valid, and it must occur frequently. But 
not every type of common, deceptive, invalid argument becomes a named fallacy. For 
that to occur, the type of argument has to be plausible enough to appear to not be 
fallacious; it has to be plausible enough that it can pass as an instance of some type of 
good argument. An argument that is so obviously bad that no sane person would accept 
it does not get to be called an instance of a fallacy. Second, the argument has to be one 
that is used sufficiently often that it is worthwhile naming it as a fallacy. This seems to 
                                                
4 Some logically valid arguments—for example, petitio principii—are fallacious. For simplicity I will 
ignore such cases here. A valid argument is one where, if all the premises were true, the conclusion could 
not possibly be false. 
5 Galileo’s position remains attractive. In a note to the above, the authors describe this as a “narrow 
definition” because it excludes arguments with false premises.  
6 Heath rightly ignores cases such as begging the question that are both fallacious and logically valid. 
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be the standard used by the authors of most critical thinking textbooks. For example, in 
the very popular Oxford University Press textbook, The Power of Critical Thinking 
(Canadian Edition), by Lewis Vaughan and Chris MacDonald, we find this:  
 
There are certain types of defective arguments that recur so frequently 
that they have names (given to them, in many cases, by ancient 
philosophers or medieval scholars) and are usually gathered into critical 
thinking texts so students can become aware of them. Such common, 
flawed arguments are known as fallacies, and they are therefore said to 
be fallacious. Fallacies are often beguiling; they can seem plausible. 
Time and again they are psychologically persuasive, though logically 
impotent. The primary motivation for studying fallacies, then, is to be 
able to detect them so you’re not taken in by them (2008:170-171, 
emphasis in original). 
 
A rarely used argument which seems to be genuine but which is not really so might 
count as a fallacious argument, but we would not call it a fallacy. This is because 
fallacies are commonly used fallacious arguments—indeed, those common enough to 
warrant naming them as fallacies. This use is employed even when one is not writing on 
argumentation theory, or rhetoric, or in core areas of critical thinking. Thus, Chris 
MacDonald, in “Critical Thinking for Business Ethics”, says that fallacies are “errors in 
reasoning [that] are so common that, over the years, they’ve been given names” (2012: 
33). In sum, uncommon errors do not get to be named fallacies.  
To be fully accurate, one should say that named fallacies are arguments that would 
be frequently used in the absence of a name for the fallacy. This is because, in naming a 
fallacy, the hope of argumentation theorists, rhetoricians, and critical thinking scholars is 
to reduce the frequency of that type of reasoning. (That is also my reason for suggesting 
that “the zero tolerance fallacy” be added to our collection of named fallacies.) But, if our 
standard were that something is properly a named fallacy only if its use is sufficiently 
frequent to warrant giving the fallacy a special name, and if doing that were to 
substantially reduce the frequency with which people commit the fallacy, then by our 
standard we would have to drop the fallacy from our list of named fallacies (because, 
subsequent to naming it, its use would become infrequent). Sadly there is no reason to 
fear that this worry is one worth holding. People have been naming fallacies since 
Aristotle’s time and, so far as I know, there has never been a case where naming a fallacy 
has been so effective in changing people’s patterns of argumentation as to actually make 
the fallacy extinct. The best that argumentation theorists can hope for in pointing out a 
certain form of reasoning as fallacious is a modest decline in the use of that type of 
reasoning. Consequently, I will not worry that, by filling our critical thinking and 
argumentation texts with warnings against using the zero tolerance fallacy, instances of 
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that fallacy will become so rare that the fallacy is not one worth bringing to people’s 
attention. 
Despite the foregoing standard for something becoming a named fallacy, I will use 
an even narrower standard. I will hold that we should add an argument form to our list of 
recognized fallacies if, and only if, the argument is invalid, distinctive, plausible (in 
Aristotle’s sense of one that could easily be mistaken for a good argument), frequently 
used (or would be frequently used), and, finally, if its use frequently has significant 
harmful consequences. By the last condition I am suggesting harm that goes beyond just 
that of having people participate in erroneous reasoning. We already have a lot of named 
fallacies, and there is little reason for adding to our list if the form of fallacious 
reasoning causes little or no social harm. But use of common fallacious reasoning—
fallacious in that it meets the first three conditions discussed above—that does cause 
serious social harm warrants being given a name. We need to be able to briefly identify 
instances of reasoning which are not just substandard but which also lead to significant 
social harms when people are taken in by them. My claim is that arguments of the type I 
am suggesting we call zero tolerance fallacies do meet all five of these individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for warranting becoming a new named 
fallacy.  
To review, my conditions for adding a new fallacy to our collection of named 
fallacies are: 
- the argument type is invalid 
- it is a distinctive type of argument 
- arguments of this type are often plausible (or seem to be valid) 
- the argument type is frequently used 
- the argument type is one whose use causes significant harm. 
The above constitutes a rigorous standard for adding a new named fallacy to our 
collection. I will now characterize the fallacy I think we should name, showing that 
it meets the first three conditions above. I will not, in this paper, defend the position 
that arguments that I think should be called instances of the zero tolerance fallacy 
meet the last two conditions. I take the facts here to be sufficiently obvious for the 
reader to discern this for herself.  
3. Characterizing the Zero Tolerance Fallacy 
A zero tolerance policy is one that automatically imposes a punishment for any 
violation of a given social rule. Once such a policy is in place, those charged with 
enforcing the policy are forbidden from using discretion as to whether observed 
violations of the policy are to be brought to the attention of those charged with 
punishing violators; and there is no provision for the punishment to be lessened or 
altered to fit particular circumstances. The only issue that may legitimately be 
entertained is whether the rule was violated. If it was, then the fixed punishment is to be 
imposed. Almost always when zero tolerance policies are adopted—though this is not 
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essential—the offences are strict liability offences. Indeed, from here on I will assume 
that the offences are strict liability ones. In addition, the penalty attached is usually 
thought to be severe relative to the offence that was committed. 
Sometimes people adopt a zero tolerance policy for good reasons. They may judge 
that some activity or behavior has harmful consequences (or is itself harmful) and that 
the best or most cost-effective way to eliminate or minimize the behavior is to adopt a 
policy of zero tolerance towards that behavior. Reasonable people may well disagree 
about whether the behavior is such that steps ought to be taken to reduce its occurrence, 
or they may think that having zero tolerance for such behavior is draconian. (For 
example, someone might advocate a zero tolerance policy towards the possession of a 
drug. Others might think there should be no penalty attached to possession or 
consumption of that drug. Still others might think that people ought to be discouraged 
from possessing and consuming the drug in question but hold that a zero tolerance 
policy is simply too extreme a tool for dealing with the matter.) But we can hardly hold 
that if such behavior is to be eliminated or reduced as much as possible, then advocating 
the best or most cost-effective means of reducing that behavior necessarily involves the 
advocate in a fallacy. Nor am I interested in considering here those cases where people 
disagree about whether a particular behavior is one we want to discourage. Our interest 
is in whether having a zero tolerance policy is an appropriate means to a social end, not 
whether that end is one the society should seek to attain. 
Rather, I am concerned with cases where a zero tolerance policy is adopted 
because, while it may seriously be believed that adopting such a policy is a good way to 
reduce the behavior in question, there is no evidence, or there is inadequate evidence, to 
support this belief (or those advocating the policy do not know of such evidence). In 
general, then, we can say that one commits the zero tolerance fallacy when one 
advocates or imposes a zero tolerance policy towards some activity while lacking 
evidence for supposing that having zero tolerance for that activity will best serve to 
reduce the activity in question.7 
4. Motivation for Committing the Fallacy 
The normal motivation for committing the zero tolerance fallacy is that officials 
think they need to appear to be doing something to address a supposed problem. If some 
behavior is unwanted and nothing is being done by those responsible for regulating 
behavior in that area, there is the concern that those responsible will be seen to be 
irresponsible. But adopting a zero tolerance policy against the unwanted behavior is an 
easy way to be seen to be doing something forceful to eliminate the problem. This is 
                                                
7 Here I assume that evidence can, in principle, be obtained. Of course, I allow that the methods of 
providing such evidence—statistical analysis, precedent, arguments by analogy, et cetera—are likely to be 
quite varied. I am not sure what we should say about cases where evidence cannot be obtained, either 
because obtaining such evidence is impossible (as it might well be in some instances about the distant 
past) or because obtaining the evidence would violate serious ethical or legal protections of privacy 
needed to ensure that individuals can pursue lives free from undue interference. 
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because the policy is simple and applies in an on-off way, with no need to weigh the 
details of particular cases. Furthermore, the stiff penalties attached to violations give the 
appearance that authorities are taking the matter seriously and doing something about it. 
But a zero tolerance policy may turn out to be counter-productive. For instance, 
those charged with carrying out the policy—that is, with enforcing it—may simply not 
enforce it, or it may be the case that their enforcement of it will be much more lax than it 
would have been had some more reasonable policy been adopted. Suppose that, for 
some reason, parents come to fear that their children will be endangered if things that 
might be used as weapons are allowed at their children’s school. (This is a perfectly 
natural and strong fear and one that sometimes hinders clear reasoning.) Suppose further 
that the school board or the school principal responds to these concerns by adopting the 
zero tolerance policy of forbidding students from bringing to school items that might be 
used as weapons. If those charged with enforcing the policy see the penalty attached as 
being overly severe, they may well not enforce the policy. They may simply pretend not 
to observe relevant violations of the rule, and in the end this practice may result in even 
less deterrence than there would be if a non-zero tolerance rule was in place to 
discourage such behavior.  
In the case imagined above, if expulsion from the school is the penalty attached to 
violation of the new rule and a child is discovered to have accidentally violated the 
policy, teachers or playground supervisors might just look the other way. Or they might 
enforce the rule differentially, based on some prejudice they have. Either way, their 
actions (or lack thereof) may serve to undermine the very purpose or aim for which the 
zero tolerance policy was originally adopted. Things become much more complicated if 
children seize the opportunity to report on other children as a way of settling playground 
quarrels.  
5. Problems 
I now turn to several problems that arise from the idea that we should have a new 
named fallacy, the zero tolerance fallacy. First, and most obviously, the fallacy in a zero 
tolerance argument is often hard to identify because the fallacious argument is implicit. 
Most arguments (at least as they are first presented) include implicit assumptions or 
hidden premises. Indeed, fallacious arguments are less likely to be explicit than fully 
developed arguments are, for the simple reason that, once an argument is made explicit, 
it is often easier to determine whether it is fallacious (and, typically at least, those who 
employ fallacious arguments either do not realize they are doing so or, when they are 
aware of this, they certainly do not want their audience to know it). The typical 
argument for a zero tolerance policy is an enthymeme—an argument with a missing or 
suppressed premise. And it is typically this premise that lacks adequate support.  
We might break this problem down as follows: 
1. Fallacies are arguments, and rarely is a full argument provided for adopting a 
zero tolerance policy. 
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2. Such arguments as are provided for adopting a zero tolerance policy are almost 
always enthymemes. 
3. Enthymemes pose increased difficulties in interpretation. 
4. There are cases where there are valid—indeed sound—arguments for zero 
tolerance policies. (And these have the same logical form as the fallacious arguments.) 
5. Sometimes we want policies or rules that are (in some sense) overly strict, and 
these cases are sometimes difficult to distinguish from others. 
But we should note the following considerations that collectively weaken the objection. 
(The numbers below respond to each of the numbered points above.) 
1. This is a standard problem with social rules—rarely is a full justification offered. 
(This is so even in so-called hard cases of law where, typically, experts go to great 
lengths to justify their favored interpretation of a social policy or principle.8) 
2. The enthymeme is almost always filled in along the following lines: (i) we have 
this unwanted behavior; (ii) having zero tolerance for the behavior is the best way to 
reduce/eliminate the behavior; (iii) we have adopted (and put into place) a zero tolerance 
policy regarding the behavior; (iv) therefore we are doing the best we can to 
eliminate/reduce the behavior. 
3. Premise (ii) (or something like it) is almost always the one in need of evidential 
support. And it is almost always the one that lacks such support. 
4. Sometimes people have support for premise (ii) (or such support is easily 
available), and in those cases the fallacy has not been committed (or the charge that it 
has been can easily be countered). Simply pointing out the existence of such evidence to 
those who object to the zero tolerance policy is generally a social good. 
5. In circumstances where we want simple absolutist rules, we also want flexibility 
in enforcing those rules—precisely those circumstances where we do not want zero 
tolerance policies. 
It is, of course, an empirical matter how often there is a more effective approach 
available to us to rid ourselves of a social ill than the adoption of a zero tolerance policy.  
At present we often lack good empirical data regarding how frequently this occurs.9 
Indeed, we do not even know roughly what percentage of times zero tolerance policies 
are more or less effective than other options in even a limited area. (The articles by 
                                                
8 Ronald Dworkin (1978: Chapter 4) distinguishes hard cases from clear ones operationally. A legal case 
is a hard case when reasonable people knowing all the relevant facts, including all the facts of institutional 
history, disagree on the proper disposition of the case.  
9 Marshall (1999) contains a good discussion. Lacking solid data forces us to rely on the wisdom collected 
by others. Perhaps most relevant here is Montaigne’s observations about having zero tolerance for ending 
a marriage. He observes that, “We have thought to tie the knot of our marriages more firmly by taking 
away all means of dissolving them; but the knot of will and affection has become loosened and undone as 
much as that of constraint has tightened. And on the contrary, what kept marriages in Rome so long in 
honour and security was everyone’s freedom to break them off at will. They loved their wives the better 
because they might lose them; and, with full liberty of divorce, five hundred years and more passed before 
anyone took advantage of it” (1580, Chapter XV: 320). 
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Wilson and Kelling (1982) and by Marshall (1999) are good places to start in reviewing 
the available data.) But this fact should not be seen to be an undue hindrance to adopting 
the language I propose.  For consider the circumstances under which one is likely to 
claim that someone else has committed the zero tolerance fallacy (or to worry that one is 
committing it oneself). It is quite likely that someone will have either proposed or 
already have put in place a zero tolerance policy about some activity or behavior. The 
opponent of this policy may object for roughly two types of reasons. First, of course, she 
may think that the behavior in question does not need to be restricted, that there is 
nothing wrong with the behavior in itself and that it will not lead to negative 
consequences (or, at least, not consequences that are serious enough to warrant 
restricting someone’s liberty). Second, she may agree that the behavior in question ought 
to be reduced and simply think either that having a zero tolerance policy is likely to be 
ineffective or that it is overly harsh (most likely because, in practice, it is almost certain 
to result in punishing too many of those who, for one reason or another, ought not to be 
punished).  
If the objection is really of the first type, the challenge is easily responded to 
simply by pointing out that the objector disagrees with the end the policy seeks to reach, 
not with the means to that end. Advocates and opponents of the end in question can then 
get on with the matter of debating that issue. If the objection is of the second type, the 
defender of the policy has several options. She can offer data supporting the idea that, in 
this case, a zero tolerance policy is more likely to work than other policies. This need 
not include sophisticated statistical analysis, for such may not be available. Something 
as simple as “We have looked at [or have tried] other options and none of them seem to 
work as well as zero tolerance” is sometimes all one needs to defend against the charge 
that one has committed the zero tolerance fallacy. But if the defender cannot offer such 
data or a compelling reason for thinking that in this sort of case the data is unlikely to be 
available, she and her supporters will doubtless be prompted to look for such data. If, on 
the other hand, she does have such data, then she has not committed the fallacy. Finally, 
in those cases where someone has adopted a zero tolerance policy without having 
supporting data that such a policy is more effective than other alternatives but she is able 
to quickly find such data—so that the fallacy has been committed—then the finding and 
reporting of such data in response to the challenge that she committed the fallacy shows 
that, in this case, committing the fallacy itself did little harm. Furthermore, the charge 
that the fallacy had been committed will have had the virtue of bringing to light relevant 
data about what modifies behavior in this type of situation. 
So, in general, it seems that making the claim that someone who has adopted or 
advocated a zero tolerance policy has committed a fallacy—viz., the zero tolerance 
fallacy—is likely to have positive results. Either the disagreement will be seen to be 
about ends rather than means, or if the end is agreed upon and the means are what is 
disputed, then both sides will turn to the issue of finding evidence to support their 
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positions. And, we can hope, the side with the strongest evidential support is the one that 
will win that debate. Thus, we will be more likely to have zero tolerance policies 
confined to those situations where they are somewhat likely to accomplish what people 
hope they will.  
6. Good Zero Tolerance Arguments10 
I have been arguing that we need a new named fallacy, the zero tolerance fallacy. 
And I have been seeking to characterize that fallacy. But one might think that I should 
have proceeded in a different way. Given that there are cases where there is good reason 
to adopt zero tolerance policies and given that there can be good arguments for adopting 
such policies, it would, in those cases, seem that the logical way to proceed would be to 
characterize the structure of good or acceptable zero tolerance arguments, and then to 
characterize zero tolerance fallacies as cases that simply fail in some respect to live up to 
the standard of a good zero tolerance argument. An analogy is with ad hominem 
arguments. For years, indeed centuries, logicians have treated these simply as fallacies. 
But since there are obviously perfectly good ad hominem arguments, some have recently 
suggested that we should seek to establish what makes good ad hominem arguments 
good while identifying those ad hominem arguments which fail to live up to this (as yet 
not fully developed) standard as instances of the ad hominem fallacy. This approach 
strikes me as potentially quite fruitful. My reason for not using it here is that it will 
almost certainly involve more than can be accomplished in a single short paper. On this 
very point, the analogy with ad hominem arguments is again helpful: while we have 
many accounts of ad hominem fallacies, we are still working towards a full account of 
what makes a successful ad hominem argument a good one. (For an interesting attempt 
along these lines, see Dahlman et al, 2011.) I would be extremely pleased if, in addition 
to making the idea of a zero tolerance fallacy a popular one, my work were to stimulate 
critical thinking theorists to work on the development of standards for successful zero 
tolerance arguments. That is a worthy goal, for then we could characterize arguments 
which commit the zero tolerance fallacy as simply those arguments which attempt to 
defend zero tolerance policies but which fail to live up to the proper standards (whatever 
those might be) for being a good zero tolerance arguments. However, it is important to 
note that we should not tolerate bad zero tolerance arguments while we wait for 
argumentation theorists to provide us with an account of what constitutes a good 
argument for zero tolerance policies.  
7. Conclusion 
I am aware that “to label the view of your philosophical opponent a ‘fallacy’ is, 
much more often than not, a cheap rhetorical trick” (Joyce, 2006: 152). Nonetheless, I 
hope I have demonstrated that having something called “the zero tolerance fallacy” as 
                                                
10 I am grateful to Leo Groake both for suggesting this approach and for pointing out the analogy that I 
consider here. His “Logic: Informal” entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is a very useful 
place to start thinking about these matters. (See in particular the sections titled “Fallacy Theory” and “An 
Example: Ad Hominem,” as well as the literature Groake cites there.) 
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part of our social and political rhetoric would be, on balance, a good thing. In those 
cases where zero tolerance policies are inappropriate, having a named fallacy would 
serve as a useful rhetorical device to make this fact known in a simple and accessible 
manner. And in cases where one might allege that the zero tolerance fallacy has been 
committed, defenders of the policy could easily respond, and their responses would 
serve to move the discussion to just those areas that are most likely to be productive of 
improved critical thinking about what social rules or policies we should endorse. In the 
end, were we lucky, all of this might help reduce the unwarranted use of zero tolerance 
policies and nudge the level of intolerance slightly closer to zero.11 
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